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TH E liberality which characterizes the corporation laws of some states tends 
to a frame of mind which dismisses from 
serious consideration reported actions of 
corporations organized under the laws of 
those states. One reads in the newspapers 
of certain actions taken by a corporation 
existing under authority of the laws of a 
certain state, and passes along to other 
news items with the thought that anything 
approved by formal vote of directors, is 
possible under such laws. The action need 
not be rational. It may be unsound econ-
omically. The effect may be a suppression 
of the facts. But if expediency so dictates, 
and the action is taken properly, the action 
has the stamp of legality. Such is likely to 
be the mental attitude of one who is 
familiar with these matters. 
In fairness to such laws, it is interesting 
to consider, without prejudice, the pro-
posed action of a certain holding company 
as reported in the news column. Is the 
action facilitated by the laws governing 
the organization and corporate conduct of 
the company in question? Is there any-
thing questionable about the proposed ac-
tion? Does it gain any improper advan-
tage on account of the character of its 
shares of capital stock and the laws author-
izing the issuance of such shares? 
"The Blank Corporation has called a 
special meeting of class B stockholders for 
November 28 to vote on a proposal to re-
duce the stated value of the class B stock 
from 365,849,369.00 to 346,842,721.00, 
thereby creating capital and capital surplus 
and applying a portion of the capital and 
surplus to write investments down to 
market value. 
"The purpose of the proposal is to reduce 
the paid-in capital of the class B stock 
from 310.00 to 35.00 and bring about a 
capital readjustment and thereby correct 
the existing situation under which the pay-
ment of dividends may be interrupted, 
while the corporation is receiving income 
from investments sufficient to cover divi-
dend requirements." 
The foregoing quotations, slightly dis-
guised, are as reported by the press from 
the company's announcement. The dis-
cussion which follows is based on the news-
paper statement. 
Analyzing the announcement, it is ap-
parent that the company issued some of its 
stock for, or purchased from the proceeds 
thereof, certain securities, at prices, which, 
on the basis of the market (October 31, 
1930) would have to be reduced substan-
tially. This would result in a material re-
duction of the balance sheet value of the 
securities owned. The paper loss incident 
to such devaluation presumably would be 
large. It would be too large to permit of 
absorption by the surplus accounts, the 
character of which is not disclosed. The 
corporation may have had earned surplus, 
or surplus arising from valuation of se-
curities, or paid-in surplus resulting from 
arbitrary classification of paid-in capital. 
At any rate, whether from motives of ne-
cessity, or of expediency, there was not suf-
ficient surplus to absorb the write down. 
And so, it is proposed that stated capital 
shall be adjusted, so reducing it as to make 
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available an amount sufficient to absorb 
the loss and still, presumably, leave a cush-
ion to guard against further market de-
clines and afford a reasonable remainder 
in the surplus available for dividends. 
Action such as the foregoing, which re-
cently has been followed by several cor-
porations, particularly of the investment 
trust class, doubtless is facilitated by the 
laws of certain states. If a corporation 
such as the type in question had nothing 
but capital stock with par value, it would 
be necessary by formal action to reduce 
the par value of the stock, call in all the 
old stock and issue new stock in its place. 
This procedure in some cases would be a 
sizable undertaking. Where the shares 
have no par value, the matter becomes one 
merely of accounting based, however, on 
formal action. In other words, a resolu-
tion of the directors, ratified by the stock-
holders whose capital would be affected, 
transferring an amount per share from 
capital to capital surplus, would serve as 
the authority for the accounting action. 
Such action would consist in transferring 
an amount from capital to capital surplus 
and charging against that surplus the 
amount of decline in the value of securities 
from cost to the lower market. 
This action would save the corporation 
from any charge of having paid dividends 
when its capital was impaired, as might 
have been the case if the capital had not 
been legally reduced. It is easy to under-
stand that if the loss in asset value of se-
curities had been charged against earned 
surplus or previous capital surplus, such 
surplus might have been insufficient to ab-
sorb the capital loss, and that even though 
subsequent income might be sufficient to 
pay subsequent dividends, a considerable 
portion of such income might be needed to 
restore capital before the dividends could 
be paid legally. 
There is a doctrine running generally 
through the corporation laws of the vari-
ous states, that dividends may not be paid 
legally while there is an impairment of 
capital. This is true of Delaware except 
that the protection of capital from the pay-
ment of dividends is limited to shares hav-
ing a preference in liquidation, as will be 
seen from the following: 
"Section 34. Dividends; Reserves:— 
The directors of every corporation created 
under this Chapter, subject to any restric-
tions contained in its Certificate of Incor-
poration, shall have power to declare and 
pay dividends upon the shares of its capital 
stock either (a) out of its net assets in 
excess of its capital as computed in accord-
ance with the provisions of Sections 14, 
26, 27 and 28 of this Chapter, or (b) in 
case there shall be no such excess, out of 
its net profits for the fiscal year then cur-
rent and /or the preceding fiscal year; pro-
vided, however, that if the capital of the 
corporation computed as aforesaid shall 
have been diminished by depreciation in 
the value of its property, or by losses, or 
otherwise, to an amount less than the ag-
gregate amount of the capital represented 
by the issued and outstanding stock of all 
classes having a preference upon the dis-
tribution of assets, the directors of such 
corporation shall not declare and pay out 
of such net profits any dividends upon any 
shares of any classes of its capital stock 
until the deficiency in the amount of the 
capital represented by the issued and out-
standing stock of all classes having a pref-
erence upon the distribution of assets shall 
have been repaired." * * * 
There is nothing further in the section 
that qualifies the foregoing. The sections 
referred to (Sections 14, 26, 27 and 28) 
cover respectively, issuance of shares, 
amendment of certificate of incorporation, 
retirement of preferred shares, and reduc-
tion of capital. The provisions therein do 
not interfere with the rules laid down in 
Section 34. 
Out of the section just quoted, one might 
read that common capital may be paid 
away as dividends. "Capital * * * dimin-
ished * * * by losses, or otherwise, * * *" 
might so imply. Capital might be dim-
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inished "otherwise" by the payment of 
dividends. It is doubted, however, if this 
would be a fair inference. The word 
"capital" used in a general sense is all 
embracive. It does not distinguish one 
class from another. It includes both pre-
ferred and common capital as those classes 
are denoted by preferred and common 
shares. Consequently, any excess of net 
assets over capital must mean any amount 
of net assets in excess of capital as repre-
sented by both preferred and common 
capital stock. If the directors may declare 
a dividend out of any such excess, it is fair 
to assume that they may not declare a 
dividend if there is no such excess. 
The significance of the provision for de-
claration of dividends out of "its net profits 
for the fiscal year then current and /or the 
preceding fiscal year" is more difficult to 
interpret. Reference to the "current fiscal 
year" is understandable. A corporation 
might have had its common capital im-
paired by depreciation in the value of its 
property, or by losses, and yet make a 
profit during a current fiscal year. The 
meaning of the statute in this respect is 
clear, namely, that even though common 
capital may be impaired, profits for the 
current year may be appropriated for divi-
dends without the necessity of first making 
up the impairment of common capital. 
The words "and /or the preceding year" 
appear to have been inserted by some 
zealous, although not fully informed, law-
maker in the excitement of legislative pres-
sure, inasmuch as any profits in a preceding 
year, if not used to repair capital, would 
result in net assets in excess of capital in 
the current year. If profits in the preced-
ing year had been used to repair capital, 
how could they be used for dividends in 
the current year without paying dividends 
out of capital? The statute must mean, 
therefore, that, if necessary, action through 
which capital was repaired in a preceding 
year may be reversed, if profits in the cur-
rent year are not sufficient for dividends 
and profits for the preceding year may be 
made available for dividends in the current 
year. Only in this way does it seem pos-
sible to reconcile the apparent contradic-
tion in the statute. It must not be for-
gotten, however, that preference stock 
marks the dead-line where the latitude 
stops. 
In the light of the foregoing, one may 
say that there appears to be nothing ques-
tionable legally about the proposed action 
of various investment trusts to reduce their 
capital, where the corporation laws under 
which they were chartered are as elastic as 
those of Delaware. Further, there seems 
not to be anything morally or economically 
questionable about such proposed action. 
Price levels in the stock market patently 
are lower than they have been for some 
years. Perhaps they are permanently 
lower. At least the prospects are that they 
will remain lower for some time to come. 
And it seems to be the part of wisdom to 
recognize this condition and adjust the 
asset value of securities accordingly. How-
ever, when and if the price level definitely 
rises to a point where it may be expected 
to remain for a while, any readjustment up-
ward of asset values should result in a 
credit to capital, not to earned surplus. 
The adjustment of capital downward is 
logical, if capital was invested originally in 
securities which have declined severely and 
somewhat permanently in market value. 
But any later adjustment upward should 
be consistent. If loss in security values im-
pairs capital, a recovery in such values 
would repair capital. On the other hand, 
if such book losses were to be charged 
against earned surplus, or against capital 
surplus, it would not seem inconsistent to 
repair such accounts, if losses in value 
later are reinstated. This, however, raises 
a question concerning securities written 
down now and later sold at a price in excess 
of book value. Where should the profit be 
credited? The answer should not be diffi-
cult: to capital, if a loss in excess of the 
profit was charged against capital; to capi-
tal surplus, if the charge for decline was 
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made against capital surplus; to earned 
surplus, if the charge was against that 
account. But, none of these corporations 
probably will increase the stated value of 
its capital shares unless recovery becomes 
so marked as to result in a large capital sur-
plus. And they will be within their rights, 
having taken formal action to reduce their 
stated capital. They would be within 
their legal rights also, undoubtedly, if they 
were to insist on crediting the profit to 
earned surplus and paying it out as divi-
dends, inasmuch as the adjustment of 
stated capital is tantamount to apportion-
ing their capital to absorb a loss. If the 
loss is not sustained, the action in segre-
gating a part of their capital to absorb a 
loss has in reality served to create a 
surplus. 
These corporations gain no improper ad-
vantage necessarily from shares having no 
par value and from laws permitting wide 
latitude of action. It would be a silly law 
that would not permit a corporation to 
adjust its capital account to give effect to 
capital losses. No legislation can prevent 
a corporation from losing money. One 
may take issue with a law that permits con-
tributed capital to be apportioned at time 
of receipt between capital account and sur-
plus account, and still find no fault with the 
same law that sanctions and encourages a 
corporation which has lost part of its capi-
tal to adjust its capital accounts accord-
ingly. Any group of stockholders may 
agree among themselves to do anything 
legal or not to do anything illegal. If the 
stockholders in a given group agree that 
they have lost a part of their capital, what 
is more logical than to agree to give ex-
pression to that loss. 
In a matter of shares without par value, 
nothing is gained through placing a stated 
value on each share except convenience in 
accounting for any number of shares less 
than the whole. The capital account might 
be reduced, or increased, as easily if the 
shares had no stated value. In the instant 
case, shares without par value permit of a 
ready reduction in capital without having 
to call in and exchange all outstanding 
shares. 
